Beyond Mirroring
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.29
Summary
The current debate on empathy features many competing definitions and approaches with no consensus in sight. Rather than resolving these disputes, this paper opens a new perspective by applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded approaches to empathy research. These approaches integrate insights from phenomenology and cognitive science, highlighting the roles of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective. They also challenge the common assumption that empathy is simply a form of affective matching or mirroring.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded approaches offer a new perspective on empathy that integrates phenomenology and cognitive science and challenges the view that empathy is merely affective matching or mirroring. |
Abstract
Abstract When considering the current debate on empathy, it quickly becomes evident that a diversity of definitions of and approaches to the topic are available, and that no consensus seems forthcoming. The aim of our contribution is not to resolve these disputes or to argue in favor of any one particular way of conceptualizing empathy. Instead, our aim is to open up a new perspective by exploring the potential of applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded approaches to empathy research. As we shall see, these approaches help to integrate insights from phenomenology and the cognitive sciences in thinking about empathy, as well as in understanding the role of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective in empathy. They also highlight the inadequacy of the widespread assumption that empathy amounts to a form of affective matching or mirroring.