Enacting affectivity
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.31
Summary
The enactive approach to cognition implies that thinking is inherently emotional and embodied, not purely brain-based. It argues that dynamic systems theory best explains the variability of emotional episodes across people while recognizing evolution's role in shaping physiological and behavioral aspects. Additionally, it proposes that the physical basis of emotions can extend beyond the body to include external processes, which can become part of affective experience.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The enactive approach entails that cognition is inherently affective and embodied, that dynamical systems theory best accounts for emotional variability, and that extraorganismic processes can be part of the physical realizers of affectivity. |
Abstract
Abstract The enactive approach to mind and cognition has several important implications for our understanding of affectivity. It entails that cognition is inherently affective and, relatedly, that the process of cognitive appraisal is not “purely brainy” but embodied. It also entails that a dynamical systems approach is more suitable than other conceptual frameworks to account for the variability of emotional episodes across individuals and populations, while acknowledging the important role of evolution in shaping the physiological and behavioral aspects of those episodes. Finally, the enactive approach does not entail that the material vehicles of affective episodes are necessarily only biological processes occurring inside the organism; rather, it allows extraorganismic processes to be part of the physical realizers of affectivity, and to be phenomenologically incorporated into affective experiences.