Direct Social Perception
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.15
Summary
Direct social perception (DSP) argues that people can directly perceive others' mental states—emotions, desires, intentions—through their expressive, goal-directed behavior, challenging the view that mental states are hidden inside the head. This chapter examines DSP historically through phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty, and supports it with evidence from 4E cognition and cognitive science, including work suggesting embodied expressions like facial expressions and gestures may constitute part of emotions themselves. The author defends DSP against objections.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Direct social perception challenges the assumption that mental states are intracranial and perceptually inaccessible, arguing that others' mental states can be directly perceived through their embodied expressions. |
Abstract
Abstract Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending DSP against several objections.