Realism without tears II: The structuralist legacy of sensory physiology.
Studies in history and philosophy of science February 1, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.01.003 via PubMed
Summary
The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies implies that perceptual qualities do not reveal the nature of their external causes. This paper argues that the methodological principles behind the doctrine remain valid, so any naturalistic philosophy of perception must accept this skeptical conclusion. However, this does not force global skepticism; instead, epistemic structural realism, as articulated by Helmholtz, follows from the doctrine when active exploration is recognized as part of the mechanism determining perceptual experience. This view aligns with contemporary embodied perception theories and offers lessons for structural realists in philosophy of science.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The qualities of perceptual experience are not determined by, and do not reveal the nature of, their causes in the world, but epistemic structural realism offers a viable response to this skeptical conclusion. |
Abstract
This paper examines the implications of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies for contemporary philosophy and psychology. Part I analyzed Johannes Peter Müller's canonical formulation of the Doctrine, arguing that it follows from empirical results combined with methodological principles. Here, I argue that these methodological principles remain valid in psychology today, consequently, any naturalistic philosophy of perception must accept the Doctrine's skeptical conclusion, that the qualities of our perceptual experience are not determined by, and thus do not reveal the nature of, their causes in the world. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we must be global skeptics; rather, I argue that contemporary epistemology of perception should embrace Müller's own response to the Doctrine: epistemic structural realism. As articulated by Müller's student, Helmholtz, structural realism follows from the Doctrine once we recognize that active exploration constitutes part of the mechanism that determines perceptual experience, a view congenial to contemporary theories of embodied perception in cognitive science. Structural realists in philosophy of science should likewise heed the lessons of the Doctrine, as it played a critical part in the early history of their view, and may still serve a constructive role as exemplar today.