Realism without tears I: Müller's Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies.
Studies in history and philosophy of science December 1, 2019 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.01.002 via PubMed
Summary
The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies, which holds that we perceive the activity of our nerves rather than external properties, has been highly influential in perception research. Johannes Peter Müller's original formulation is often assumed to have idealist or skeptical implications. This paper argues that Müller actually advanced a realist interpretation resembling epistemic structural realism. It analyzes Müller's structuralist epistemology and reconstructs his defense of the Doctrine, then argues for the Doctrine's continued relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of perception, and history of philosophy of science.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Müller's Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies was interpreted by Müller himself as a form of epistemic structural realism, not idealism or skepticism. |
Abstract
The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies has been and continues to be enormously influential in the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. In simple terms, the Doctrine states that we directly perceive in the first instance the activity of our nerves, rather than properties in the external world. The canonical early statement of the Doctrine by the physiologist Johannes Peter Müller had profound influence on both the philosophy and psychology of the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially as reformulated and transmitted by Müller's student Helmholtz. A common assumption of historical and ongoing debate about the Doctrine has been its supposedly idealist or skeptical implications. What is not commonly recognized is that Müller himself advanced a realist interpretation along lines that would be recognized today as a form of epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller's structuralist epistemology in detail and reconstructs his articulation and defense of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies in its canonical form. Part II argues for the continued importance of the Doctrine and its structuralist interpretation for contemporary psychology, philosophy of perception, and history of philosophy of science.