Phenomenal Socialism
Philosophies June 26, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9030063 via DOAJ
Summary
Phenomenal socialism holds that what we directly perceive is primarily high-level phenomenal properties, not low-level sensory data. This paper defends a weaker version of that view, linking it to recognitionalism—a metaethics grounded in epiphanies. It contrasts phenomenal socialism with phenomenal conservatism and liberalism, introduces phenomenal nihilism as a fourth option, and rebuts four objections to a watered-down socialism. Connections are drawn to the epistemology of modality and imagination.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | A watered-down form of phenomenal socialism—the view that we directly perceive primarily high-level phenomenal properties—can be defended against four main objections. |
Abstract
Phenomenal socialism says that what we actually, directly, literally perceive is only or primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties; this paper argues for phenomenal socialism in the weaker, primarily version. Phenomenal socialism is the philosophy of perception that goes with recognitionalism, which is the metaethics that goes with epiphanies. The first part states the recognitionalist manifesto. The second part situates this manifesto relative to some more global concerns, about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory vs. anti-theory in ethics. The third part rehearses two familiar views about the possible contents of perceptual experience, Phenomenal Conservativism and Phenomenal Liberalism. It notes that the usual catalogue omits two other theoretical possibilities, Phenomenal Socialism and Phenomenal Nihilism, and it defends a watered-down form of Phenomenal Socialism from four main objections. The fourth part makes some connections with the epistemology of modality and with the role of the imagination.