Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self

Summary

The paper challenges the claim that minimal and narrative selfhood are fundamentally distinct dimensions, arguing instead that they are deeply entwined. Drawing on classical and contemporary phenomenology, it shows that certain affective experiences convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. Due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states reveal that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.

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