Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership
September 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9148-0 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
The sense of ownership (SO) and sense of agency (SA) are not separate experiences but are intimately related and modulate each other. A careful analysis of examples used to argue for their separation reveals they are intertwined. The article proposes distinguishing different notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably and suggests a gradual reading that allows for blends of the two. This approach provides a richer phenomenology and a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The sense of ownership and sense of agency are intimately related and modulate each other, rather than being separable modalities of the minimal self. |
Abstract
We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.