Self-Awareness and the Subject-Object
Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Nature January 4, 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190883959.003.0004
Summary
Self-awareness is interpreted in multiple ways within Buddhist philosophy: as the starting point and goal of Mind-Only phenomenological analysis, as an intrinsic property of all awareness, and as a metaphysical claim of objective or absolute idealism. In the Yogācāra tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, self-awareness functions as a precondition for knowledge. Some Tibetan thinkers, such as Śākya Chokden, affirmed self-awareness as ultimate gnosis and the ultimate source of knowledge, while Tsongkhapa, following Candrakīrti, denied self-awareness and built his system on Madhyamaka's critical ontology rather than epistemology or phenomenology.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Buddhist philosophers diverge on self-awareness: some affirm it as ultimate gnosis, while others deny it in favor of Madhyamaka ontology. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses various interpretations of self-awareness, including its meaning as the beginning and culmination of Mind-Only’s phenomenological analysis. It also discusses the ways this notion has been criticized as simply another conceptual construct. Self-awareness can refer to an intransitive cognition and an intrinsic property of all awarenesses. It can also take the form of an objective or absolute idealism, as a metaphysical claim. Self-awareness has an important place in the Yogācāra tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and it functions as a precondition for knowledge. Some Tibetans like Śākya Chokden took up this trajectory of Buddhist epistemology to affirm self-awareness as ultimate gnosis, the ultimate source of knowledge. In contrast, Tsongkhapa followed Candrakīrti in denying self-awareness. He did not build his Buddhist system upon this kind of epistemology or phenomenology. Rather, his system is driven by the critical ontology of Madhyamaka.