Affectivity and Self-Displacement in Stein’s Early Phenomenology On the Role of Self-Experience in Empathy

Summary

Empathy, as described by Edith Stein, depends on a bodily self-displacement that is a precondition for a more complex orientation toward others. This view shares similarities with Varela and Depraz's neurophenomenology but cannot be reduced to a naturalized phenomenological account. Instead, bodily self-displacement aligns with Ratcliffe's theory of radical empathy, grounding empathy in a dynamic model of embodied self-experience within the broader dimension of affectivity.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, I shall argue that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be reduced to a naturalised phenomenological sense and that bodily self-displacement is pre-condition of a more complex disposition towards others as in line with Ratcliffe’s theory of radical empathy.