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Philosophy of mind

Philosophical inquiry into consciousness, subjectivity, and the mind-body relationship.

State of the evidence

Synthesized

Synthesized from 25 studies in the library · AI-generated, grounded in the abstracts below

Found by searching the library for Philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, hard problem, phenomenology, then ranked by relevance.

The provided studies do not directly address the philosophy of mind as a research question. Instead, they offer a collection of theoretical, phenomenological, and empirical perspectives on consciousness, selfhood, and experience, but without a focused synthesis or conclusion on the philosophy of mind itself.

Confidence in the evidence

Insufficient
  • No study directly investigates the philosophy of mind as a defined research question.
  • The studies are a mix of theoretical, phenomenological, and empirical works with no common hypothesis or methodology.
  • There is no evidence of a systematic review or meta-analysis on the topic.
How we rate confidence

Confidence reflects the strength of the underlying evidence, not whether the result is favorable. It weighs the number and size of studies, their design (randomized trials count for more than observational or single-case work), how consistently they point the same way, and their risk of bias.

Tiers run from Insufficient to High. High is rare in this field: small, early, or open-label studies land lower even when their direction is encouraging.

Evidence by study

Direction is each study's finding relative to your question: Supports, Opposes, No effect, Mixed, or Unclear.

This paper proposes a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This paper discusses the link between dopamine, salience, and psychosis, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This is a book review discussing body consciousness and somaesthetics, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This paper discusses classic hallucinogens and mystical experiences, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This paper proposes a temporo-spatial theory of consciousness, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This bottom-up review describes the lived experience of psychosis, but does not address philosophy of mind.

qualitative

This paper presents an enactive affordance-based model for DBS-induced changes in OCD, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This article discusses drug-induced ego dissolution and its relevance for philosophy of mind, but does not provide a conclusion on the philosophy of mind itself.

theoretical

This paper reviews Francisco Varela's work on subjectivity and consciousness, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This study describes the phenomenology of near-death experiences, but does not address philosophy of mind.

observational · Sample size: 78

This study describes the visual phenomenology of LSD flashbacks, but does not address philosophy of mind.

observational · Sample size: 123

This pilot project applies micro-phenomenological methods to meditation, but does not address philosophy of mind.

qualitative

This case study describes the phenomenology of lacking a sense of boundaries, but does not address philosophy of mind.

case study · Sample size: 1

This neurophenomenological study investigates neutral hypnosis, but does not address philosophy of mind.

observational · Sample size: 37

This survey characterizes entity encounter experiences, but does not address philosophy of mind.

observational · Sample size: 2561

This case report describes dream content shifts after ketamine infusions, but does not address philosophy of mind.

case report · Sample size: 1

This paper proposes a neurophenomenology of shared minimal-dual awareness, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This article reflects on Kant and the philosophy of mind, but does not provide a conclusion on the philosophy of mind itself.

theoretical

This narrative review discusses abnormal self-experiences in schizophrenia, but does not address philosophy of mind.

narrative review

This conceptual paper reframes the hard problem of consciousness, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This article discusses rationality in the age of AI through 4E cognition, but does not directly address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This paper critiques the marker method for assessing consciousness in infants, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This hypothesis paper proposes a framework for psychosis, but does not address philosophy of mind.

theoretical

This paper examines Bradley's concept of immediate experience in relation to philosophy of mind, but does not provide a conclusion on the philosophy of mind itself.

theoretical

This review integrates anthropological and neuroscientific perspectives on music-induced trance, but does not address philosophy of mind.

review

Points of agreement

No clear points of agreement.

Conflicts

No notable conflicts.

Gaps

  • No study directly investigates the philosophy of mind as a defined research question.
  • The studies are a mix of theoretical, phenomenological, and empirical works with no common hypothesis or methodology.
  • There is no evidence of a systematic review or meta-analysis on the topic.
Browse these studies in the library
How we analyze this

This synthesis reads the 15 most-cited and 10 most recent studies whose primary subject is Philosophy of mind, up to 25 in all. The most-cited set anchors the established evidence, and the recent set surfaces work that is too new to have gathered citations yet.

A study qualifies only when Philosophy of mind or a known alias appears in its title or keywords, so broad reviews that mention it only in passing are left out. Each study is read from its abstract, strongest evidence first, and the summary reports the direction of the results along with any conflicts and gaps.

3,155 articles · 1,270 from the last two years · 539,650 participants across 802 studies reporting sample size

Common study designs

review 299 qualitative study 147 experimental study 77 observational cohort 120 theoretical or philosophical paper 1355

Shared Neurobiological and Computational Mechanisms of Psychedelic, Contemplative, and Fasting-Induced Mystical Experience

Alex Jinich-Diamant preprint

Mystical states induced by psychedelics, meditation, or fasting all converge on the same brain state: a transient near-critical regime. Serotonergic psychedelics relax top-down priors by sensitizing layer 5 pyramidal neurons; open-monitoring meditation elevates cortical entropy through altered thalamocortical connectivity; caloric restriction destabilizes the default mode network by attenuating metabolic support for high-level attractors. The depth of the mystical state, not the method of induction, predicts lasting therapeutic benefit, suggesting conscious experience itself is the mechanistic agent of change. This framework proposes that near-critical dynamics may allow field-theoretic and quantum-coherent contributions to consciousness to become detectable.

Now is the Time: Operationalizing Generative Neurophenomenology through Interpersonal Methods

Anne Monnier, Lena Adel, Guillaume Dumas preprint

Neurophenomenology, which combines first-person experience with third-person neurobehavioral data, is extended to address intersubjective and social dimensions of lived experience. The article clarifies three meanings of 'generative'—generative phenomenology, generative passages, and generative models—and proposes updating the approach by moving from individual to multiple-person phenomenology, including measures of multimodal interpersonal synchrony, and using computational tools to integrate viewpoints without endorsing computationalism. Clinical relevance is illustrated through case studies in autism (interactive dyads) and family therapy (multiple members), showing translational potential.

Phenomenal Consciousness in Females and Access Consciousness in Males Are More Closely Associated with Emotions

Yixiao Sun, Zhihao Ma • 1 citation preprint

Phenomenal consciousness (self-focused awareness, measured as agency) and access consciousness (meaning in life) relate differently to emotions in females and males. In females, phenomenal consciousness is more closely tied to emotions; in males, access consciousness is. Specifically, females with higher agency are more prone to disgust, while males with greater meaning in life are less likely to experience disgust. These sex-differentiated links may inform understanding of emotion regulation and coping strategies for external risks.

Transdiagnostic conceptualization of schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder. An integrative framework of minimal self disturbance

Ágota Vass, Gábor Csukly, Kinga Farkas • 16 citations preprint

Autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia share a disturbance in the minimal sense of self—a basic, pre-reflective awareness of being a subject of experience. This common feature cuts across diagnostic boundaries and may help explain overlapping symptoms. The authors propose a framework linking neural, cognitive, and phenomenological levels to study this self-disturbance. They argue that the neural correlates of minimal selfhood can be more reliably identified during meditation than during rest, because meditation amplifies present-focused inward attention while reducing reflective mind-wandering. This approach aligns with efforts to find biomarkers for psychopathology and to move beyond traditional diagnostic categories toward a model that takes self-experience seriously.

Exploring Perception in Philosophy and Modern Art: Introduction to Spatial Perception from Merleau-Ponty's Perspective

Qeios • Milad Olfat

Merleau-Ponty's innovation is treating the body as existence or ontology, rejecting the separation of thought and body. He opposed mechanical psychology and two forms of absolutism—absolute Christianity and absolute Marxism—by introducing perception to connect consciousness and objectivity. Following Cezanne, he rejected dualism, integrating soul and body, sight and action. He emphasized the body's role in emotional perception and believed in a unified subject or Gestalt rather than isolated emotion or consciousness. His phenomenology extracts hypotheses humans make about themselves and their world. Time, for him, rises in human beings, who live in a continuum moving toward the future while reflecting on past experiences.

The God receptor: naturalistic, psychotic and entheogenic neurocognition in the origins and phenomenology of spiritual and religious thought

Bernard Crespi, Nancy Yang, Sam Doesburg preprint

The human brain does not contain a single region or network dedicated to spiritual or religious thought. Instead, religious and spiritual cognition may arise from the widespread effects of a specific receptor, the HT2A receptor, which influences perception, emotion, and cognition across many brain areas. The hypothesis is supported by integrating fMRI and lesion studies with data on HT2A receptor distribution, activation in psychedelic experiences, psychiatric conditions, and stress. If true, understanding the neuroscience of spirituality will require studying how adaptive and hyperactivated HT2A receptor signaling interacts with predictive coding and other brain systems.

Altered states of Ganzfeld: A systematic review

Anney Roy

A systematic review of controlled trials on the Ganzfeld experiment, which uses dim light and static sound to create a uniform perceptual field, found that only four such studies were conducted between 2000 and 2022. The review confirms that alpha brainwave interactions are involved in hallucination-like imagery during Ganzfeld stimulation. The authors highlight a significant gap in research on Ganzfeld-induced altered states of consciousness.

"Advaita, Quantum Physics, and the Nature of Consciousness: A Philosophical Dialogue"

Preprints.org • Ranjeet Kumar Verma preprint

A dialogue between Advaita Vedanta's non-dualistic consciousness and quantum physics suggests that both challenge materialist views of reality. Advaita holds that consciousness (Brahman) is the fundamental reality and the material world is illusion (Maya). Quantum phenomena such as wave-particle duality, non-locality, and the observer effect resonate with this view, implying reality is interconnected, probabilistic, and observer-dependent. The paper proposes that quantum physics may offer a scientific framework supporting Advaita's claim that consciousness is the substratum of reality, and examines how the observer effect aligns with the Advaitic principle that reality is shaped by consciousness. This contributes to philosophy of mind and science by proposing a unified, non-dual model of consciousness.

Nondual Awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

Zoran Josipovic • 8 citations

Consciousness-as-such, or nondual awareness, is fundamentally different from the contents of awareness and levels of arousal. Its essential property is non-representational reflexivity, making it a unique kind that cannot be reduced to any contents, functions, or states, including the indeterminate substrate. This theoretical paper outlines an expanded map of consciousness that includes the indeterminate substrate and nondual awareness alongside well-known contents and arousal levels. The author further discusses a previous hypothesis on the precuneus network for nondual awareness in relation to non-representational reflexivity and other neural correlates.

Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience

Zoran Josipovic, Vladimir Miskovic • 2 citations

Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs), episodes of greatly reduced phenomenal content and arousal, have been proposed as examples of consciousness-as-such. This paper argues that consciousness-as-such is better understood as a unique kind of non-conceptual, non-propositional, nondual awareness that is non-representational. The authors suggest that the standard two-dimensional model of consciousness—arousal level plus phenomenal content—cannot adequately capture this awareness. They propose that consciousness-as-such, and consciousness more broadly, should be studied as a distinct phenomenon.