The transgender experience and the limits of physiological continuity theories

Summary

A philosophical tension exists between physiological continuity theories of personal identity and a common framing of transgender experience. Physiological continuity theories hold that a person persists over time due to bodily or brain continuity. A standard account of transgender identity emphasizes that a person's gender identity can differ from their assigned sex at birth, which seems to challenge the idea that bodily continuity alone defines who one is. The paper outlines this conflict and proposes two alternative resolutions: either revise the framing of transgender experience or modify the physiological continuity theory. Both approaches face difficulties, but each can resolve the tension without contradiction.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this paper I want to address an issue at the intersection of the philosophy of personal identity and the philosophy of transgender identity: the fact that, on one influential way of framing the transgender experience, it is incompatible with, and therefore constitutes a challenge for, physiological continuity theories of personal identity. To see this, I begin by outlining the relevant part of physiological continuity theories. Then I turn to the relevant thesis about the transgender experience. After explaining why these are in tension, I conclude with two alternate ways of moving forward, arguing that, although both approaches face challenges, either suffices to avoid this tension.