Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception
Australasian Journal of Philosophy October 25, 2020 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1826047 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
The traditional view holds that qualities must inhere in substances to exist. Berkeley argues that sensible qualities are ideas that depend on minds for their existence, not by inhering in them but by being perceived. This alternative framework, once properly understood, provides a solution to a central problem in the philosophy of perception: how ordinary perception can acquaint us with a mind-independent world despite the mind's power to create phenomenally rich experiences.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key finding | Berkeley's account of sensible qualities as mind-dependent ideas that exist by being perceived offers a solution to the problem of how perception can acquaint us with a mind-independent world. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to solve a central problem that still plagues the philosophy of perception—the problem of how, given the power of the mind to create phenomenally rich experiences, ordinary perception can nonetheless be said to acquaint us with the mind-independent world.