God and Phenomenal Consciousness
February 18, 2008 DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511498961
Summary
Yujin Nagasawa connects the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion by showing that influential arguments against the existence of God share a parallel structure with arguments by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against physicalism about consciousness. He uses this parallel to develop new objections to Nagel's and Jackson's arguments. From the failure of those arguments, Nagasawa derives a thesis he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism': the world is entirely physical, yet some physical facts cannot be captured by any complete theory of the physical sciences.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Nagasawa argues that the parallel structure between arguments against God's existence and arguments against physicalism leads to a novel thesis, non-theoretical physicalism, which holds that the world is entirely physical but some physical facts elude complete scientific theories. |
Abstract
In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. First, he introduces some of the most powerful arguments against the existence of God and provides objections to them. He then presents a parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and Nagel's arguments. Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'. Through this thesis, he shows that although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.