Embodied cognition: So flexible as to be "disembodied"?
Consciousness and Cognition January 22, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103075 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
When people incorporate an external object or body into their sense of self—a process called embodiment—there is a measurable cost to their actual body. This review examines evidence from studies of action observation, tool use, the rubber hand illusion, and full-body illusions. The findings suggest that embodiment involves both benefits, such as extending one's capabilities, and costs, including partial disembodiment of one's own body. The argument has implications for the embodied cognition approach.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Medicine |
| Key finding | Embodiment of external objects or bodies produces a measurable cost on the subject's own body, involving partial disembodiment. |
Abstract
This review aims to explore what I call the "Embodiment Cost Hypothesis" (ECH), according to which, when humans "embody" a part of the world other than their bodies, a measurable cost is detectable on their real bodies. The review analyzes experimental evidence in favor of the ECH by examining studies from different research fields, including studies of action observation (2), tool-use (3), rubber hand illusion (4), and full-body illusions (5). In light of this literature, this review argues that embodiment effects can profitably be seen as phenomena associated with both benefits (resulting from the embodiment of external objects/bodies) and costs (resulting from the disembodiment at various levels of the subject's own body). Implications are discussed in relation to the ongoing debate on the embodied cognition (EC) approach.