AI Subjectivity Without Embodiment

Summary

Artificial intelligence only mimics the surface patterns of human perception and reasoning, but it lacks the embodied sensations and passions that give rise to genuine subjectivity. Drawing on David Hume's philosophy, the paper argues that because AI has no lived, bodily experience, it cannot be considered a true subject. This ontological distinction shifts ethical and political responsibility for algorithmic outcomes back onto human actors, rather than the machines themselves. The work rejects the idea that AI can possess subjectivity, reaffirming the unique and irreplaceable role of embodied human agency in politics and ethics.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper employs Hume’s bundle theory of perception, the primacy of embodied impressions, and the centrality of passions to examine the ontological status of artificial intelligence. It argues that AI merely simulates the functional form of Humean perceptual association, yet lacks the embodied experience and passions that constitute genuine human subjectivity. This ontological boundary redefines ethical and political accountability in algorithmic systems: responsibility inheres in human actors rather than machines. By Humean empiricism, this paper rethinks the human and the political in the age of AI, rejecting the myth of AI Subjectivity while affirming the irreplaceability of embodied human agency.