“They Were Noble Automatons Who Knew Not What They Did:” Volition in Jaynes' The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind

Consciousness, as defined by Julian Jaynes, centers on volition—the experience of willing or choosing. Jaynes argued that consciousness emerged recently in human history, between the writing of the Iliad and the Odyssey. This article highlights the overlooked role of volition in Jaynes' theory, noting that for Jaynes, changes in volitional experience mark the emergence of consciousness. The author draws attention to the fact that volition is central to Jaynes' definition of consciousness, a point not widely noted in critiques of his work.

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Abstract

An important question in consciousness research concerns its origins. In Julian Jaynes' book, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, he suggests that consciousness arose rather recently in human history, sometime between the composition of The Iliad and The Odyssey. Although Jaynes' work as a theory of consciousness has achieved a great deal of attention (and indeed criticism), what has not been widely noted is the prominent role of volition in his theory. In this article I hope to draw attention to these overlooked aspects of his theory, in particular the fact that volition is central to Jaynes' definition of consciousness and that it is changes in the nature of volitional experience that mark, for Jaynes, the emergence of consciousness.