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Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next).

Anil K Seth

Brain and neuroscience advances January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1177/2398212818816019 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern, but for much of the 20th century it was marginalized. Since the 1990s, consciousness science has regained legitimacy, now encompassing philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience as its central discipline. Researchers have learned much about neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, conscious versus unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress depends on specifying closer explanatory mappings between first-person phenomenological descriptions and third-person descriptions of embodied neuronal mechanisms. This will help reframe understanding of humanity's place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to psychiatric and neurological disorders.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Predictive coding Selfhood Volition
Key finding Progress in consciousness science depends on closer explanatory mappings between first-person phenomenological descriptions and third-person descriptions of embodied neuronal mechanisms.

Abstract

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders.

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