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Anil K Seth

11 papers in the library · 180 citations · publishing 2014-2026

Papers

From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology.

Review of philosophy and psychology January 1, 2022 Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp et al. 75 citations

A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.

Effects of External Stimulation on Psychedelic State Neurodynamics.

ACS chemical neuroscience February 7, 2024 Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas, Christopher Timmermann et al. 60 citations

LSD increases brain entropy (neural signal diversity) across all conditions, but the effect is strongest when eyes are closed. Brain entropy changes correlate with subjective psychedelic experience ratings, except when viewing a video, possibly because external stimuli compete with LSD-induced imagery. This shows context modulates neural dynamics during psychedelic experiences, highlighting the importance of environment in psychedelic psychotherapy.

Psychedelics and schizophrenia: Distinct alterations to Bayesian inference.

NeuroImage November 1, 2022 Hardik Rajpal, Pedro A M Mediano, Fernando E Rosas et al. 23 citations

Schizophrenia and drug-induced states from LSD and ketamine both increase neural signal diversity, but they differ in brain connectivity: schizophrenia shows increased information flow from front to back of the brain, while the drugs reduce it. These differences can be modeled by altering Bayesian inference in a predictive processing framework: drug effects correspond to reduced precision of prior beliefs, whereas schizophrenia involves increased precision of sensory information. The findings clarify similarities and differences between these altered states, with implications for understanding consciousness and developing mental health treatments.

Hemispherotomy leads to persistent sleep-like slow waves in the isolated cortex of awake humans.

PLoS biology October 1, 2025 Michele Angelo Colombo, Jacopo Favaro, Ezequiel Mikulan et al. 7 citations

After hemispherotomy surgery for epilepsy, which disconnects an entire brain hemisphere, the isolated cortex shows brainwave patterns typical of deep sleep or anesthesia, not wakefulness. In 10 pediatric patients, EEG recordings revealed prominent slow oscillations and a steeper spectral decay in the disconnected hemisphere, while the connected hemisphere maintained normal waking patterns. These sleep-like patterns persisted years after surgery, suggesting the isolated cortex likely lacks awareness.

Neurophenomenology of induced and natural synaesthesia.

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 9, 2019 David J Schwartzman, Daniel Bor, Nicolas Rothen et al. 7 citations

Synaesthesia, where specific stimuli automatically trigger additional perceptual experiences, offers insight into conscious perception. While traditionally considered congenital, growing evidence shows that synaesthesia-like experiences can be induced in non-synaesthetes, even in adulthood. This review examines various methods for artificially inducing such experiences and compares them to natural synaesthesia's hallmarks: consistency, automaticity, and lack of 'perceptual presence'. The authors conclude that many aspects of synaesthesia can be induced, suggesting developmental and learning components in its acquisition and extending evidence of perceptual plasticity in adults.

On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference.

Physics of life reviews March 1, 2026 Christopher J Whyte, Andrew W Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al. 5 citations

Subjective experience is multifaceted, making it hard for traditional neuroscientific theories of consciousness to be compared because each focuses on different aspects like perceptual awareness or global states. This work instead starts from active inference, a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference, and builds a minimal theory of consciousness from shared features of computational models derived under active inference. By reviewing studies that apply active inference models to consciousness, the authors identify a small set of theoretical commitments implicit in these models, pointing toward a minimal and testable theory of consciousness.

Stroboscopically induced visual hallucinations: historical, phenomenological, and neurobiological perspectives.

Neuroscience of consciousness January 1, 2025 Trevor Hewitt, Ioanna Amaya, Romy Beauté et al.

Exposure to rapid, bright stroboscopic light has been known for over 200 years to induce vivid visual hallucinations of color and geometric shapes. This narrative review summarizes the history of research on stroboscopic light stimulation (SLS), its recreational and lay-therapeutic uses, the phenomenology of the experiences it produces, and current understanding of potential neural mechanisms. Despite progress, fundamental questions remain about the full characterization of its phenomenology, its precise physiological origins, the conditions under which it leads to altered states of consciousness, and possible clinical applications.

Predictive processing as an empirical theory for consciousness science.

Cognitive neuroscience January 1, 2021 Anil K Seth, Jakob Hohwy

Theories of consciousness often treat it as a single phenomenon to be explained, but this approach struggles to capture the diverse properties of conscious experience. Progress in consciousness science requires systematic mappings between physical or biological mechanisms and the functional and phenomenological features of consciousness. The authors argue for developing theories for consciousness science rather than a single theory of consciousness, and they highlight predictive processing as a highly promising framework for this purpose.

Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next).

Brain and neuroscience advances January 1, 2018 Anil K Seth

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern, but for much of the 20th century it was marginalized. Since the 1990s, consciousness science has regained legitimacy, now encompassing philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience as its central discipline. Researchers have learned much about neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, conscious versus unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress depends on specifying closer explanatory mappings between first-person phenomenological descriptions and third-person descriptions of embodied neuronal mechanisms. This will help reframe understanding of humanity's place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to psychiatric and neurological disorders.

Consciousness and the prefrontal parietal network: Insights from attention, working memory and chunking

Frontiers in Psychology May 22, 2014 Daniel eBor, Anil K Seth

The prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely linked to both consciousness and cognitive processes like attention, working memory, and executive control. Although attention and consciousness can be dissociated under certain circumstances, attention as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness. Chunking, which involves detecting useful patterns within integrated, attended information, activates the PPN particularly robustly compared to other cognitively demanding tasks. The authors propose that these cognitive functions together form the core psychological components of consciousness, and that the main evolutionary purpose of consciousness may be to provide innovative solutions to complex or novel problems.