Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2021
Lars Sandved-Smith, Casper Hesp, Jérémie Mattout et al.
116 citations
Meta-awareness, the ability to notice the current content of consciousness, is crucial for controlling cognitive states like directing attention. This paper models meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference, treating mental actions as policy choices over higher-level cognitive states. A further hierarchical level represents meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. Simulations of mind-wandering during a sustained selective attention task illustrate how this inferential architecture enables accessing and controlling cognitive states, offering a computational foundation for a phenomenology of mental action and self-monitoring.
Consciousness and Cognition
April 28, 2022
Anna Ciaunica, Anil K. Seth, Jakub Limanowski et al.
76 citations
Depersonalisation disorder may arise when the brain fails to modulate sensory precision, leading to a loss of the normal sense of control over one's own perceptions and actions. The paper proposes that individuals with depersonalisation adopt the hypothesis that they are embodied perceivers who are not in control of their perception, while still recognizing that the controlling agent is themselves. This account uses predictive processing to explain the phenomenology of depersonalisation, including the feeling of being detached from one's own thoughts and actions. The analysis suggests specific psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that could underlie these experiences.
Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.
PsyArXiv
February 23, 2021
Maxwell James Ramstead, Anil Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
21 citations
preprint
A new approach called computational phenomenology uses generative modeling techniques from computational neuroscience to study conscious experience. The paper reviews efforts to naturalize phenomenology, addresses philosophical objections, and explains how generative models can simulate the inferential processes underlying specific types of lived experience. This differs from prior uses of generative modeling for consciousness by focusing on modeling the interpretive process that best accounts for particular phenomenal experiences.
PsyArXiv
June 10, 2020
Lars Sandved-Smith, Casper Hesp, Antoine Lutz et al.
11 citations
preprint
This theoretical paper proposes a computational model of mental action—the deliberate control of one's own thoughts and attention—by combining insights from phenomenology and active inference. The authors develop a deep-parametric active inference framework to simulate meta-awareness and attentional control, showing how agents can learn to monitor and regulate their own cognitive processes. The model suggests that meta-awareness emerges from hierarchical inference about attentional states, enabling flexible control of attention. This work bridges phenomenological philosophy and computational neuroscience, offering a formal account of how conscious agents can intentionally shape their own mental activity.