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Anna Ciaunica

9 papers in the library · 271 citations · publishing 2020-2025

Papers

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life.

Consciousness and cognition May 1, 2021 Anna Ciaunica, Axel Constant, Hubert Preissl et al. 99 citations

Perceptual experiences are shaped by prior events, as argued by Predictive Processing and Active Inference frameworks. This paper examines how such experiences begin before birth, within the womb. A key but often neglected point is that humans develop inside another human body, a universal experience. The authors focus on the emergence of minimal selfhood in utero as a process of co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, emphasizing their interdependence. They conclude by discussing implications for debates on conscious experience, the minimal self, and social cognition.

When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences June 6, 2020 Anna Ciaunica, J. C. Charlton, Harry Farmer 78 citations

Depersonalization Disorder (DPD) alters the transparency of basic embodied pre-reflective self-consciousness and impairs the ability to flexibly switch between reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. The condition involves detachment from self, body, and world (derealization), with impaired processing of bodily signals. First-hand reports describe a fracture between an observing and an observed self, similar to self-detachment in certain Buddhist meditative practices. These alterations reveal the normally tacit transparency of pre-reflective self-consciousness, like a crack in transparent glass showing an unnoticed window.

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

Consciousness and Cognition April 28, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Anil K. Seth, Jakub Limanowski et al. 76 citations

Depersonalisation disorder may arise when the brain fails to modulate sensory precision, leading to a loss of the normal sense of control over one's own perceptions and actions. The paper proposes that individuals with depersonalisation adopt the hypothesis that they are embodied perceivers who are not in control of their perception, while still recognizing that the controlling agent is themselves. This account uses predictive processing to explain the phenomenology of depersonalisation, including the feeling of being detached from one's own thoughts and actions. The analysis suggests specific psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that could underlie these experiences.

Disintegrating and Reintegrating the Self – (In)Flexible Self-Models in Depersonalisation and Psychedelic Experiences

March 13, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Adam Safron 8 citations preprint

Humans across cultures have intentionally sought to lose or escape their ordinary self, radically changing how they perceive themselves and the world. This paper contrasts the feeling of losing familiarity with one's self and body in depersonalisation experiences with similar changes induced by psychedelics and meditation, using the Active Inference Framework. The authors suggest that controlled alteration of prior expectations can flexibly modulate self- and world models, allowing individuals to leave behind habitual perceptual rigidities and open to new ways of integrating information. In contrast, depersonalisation involves an uncontrolled, rigid disintegration of habitual self-models, leaving a person feeling stuck in their mind and potentially leading to adverse clinical outcomes.

Lost in time and space? Multisensory processing of peripersonal space and time perception in people with frequent experiences of depersonalisation.

Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006) June 1, 2025 Francesca Ferroni, Edoardo Arcuri, Martina Ardizzi et al. 7 citations

Depersonalisation (DP) involves a distressing feeling of being detached from oneself and a flattened sense of time. This study examined how DP experiences affect perception of peripersonal space (the space near the body) and time. Using an audio-tactile task, no difference in peripersonal space perception was found between people with high versus low DP experiences. A mental time travel task revealed that individuals with high DP experiences performed worse overall at locating events in time relative to their present reference point, while those with low DP experiences showed significant variation in performance for past events. The findings link altered self-awareness to disrupted egocentric spatiotemporal perception.

Examining the association between depersonalisation traits and the bodily self in waking and dreaming.

Scientific reports March 13, 2024 Matt P D Gwyther, Bigna Lenggenhager, Jennifer M Windt et al. 3 citations

People with stronger depersonalisation traits—feeling detached from their own body—report more frequent dreams from an outside-observer perspective and more dreams with distinct or altered bodily sensations, along with more nightmares and higher dream recall. They also show weaker body boundaries and less trust in internal bodily signals while awake. These findings suggest that dreaming does not provide a temporary escape from depersonalisation symptoms; instead, the dream state mirrors the waking disruptions in sense of self and body.

Why Is Anything Conscious?

arXiv Preprint Archive September 22, 2024 Michael Timothy Bennett, Sean Welsh, Anna Ciaunica

Taking the naturally selected, embodied organism as a starting point, the authors provide a formalism describing how biological systems self-organise to hierarchically interpret unlabelled sensory information according to valence. Such interpretations imply behavioural policies differentiated only by the qualitative aspect of information processing. Natural selection favours systems that intervene to achieve homeostatic and reproductive goals, and quality arises to link cause to affect to motivate interventions. Access consciousness at the human level requires hierarchically modelling the self, the world/others, and the self as modelled by others, which requires phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal without access consciousness is likely common, but the reverse is implausible. The proposal lays a foundation for a formal science of consciousness.

Disintegrating and reintegrating the self—(in)flexible self-models in depersonalization and psychedelic experiences

Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry September 13, 2024 Anna Ciaunica, Adam Safron

The feeling of losing familiarity with oneself and one's body, as occurs in depersonalization and during psychedelic experiences, can be understood through active inference. Psychedelic experiences may involve radically altered prior expectations, allowing flexible modulation of self- and world models and enabling individuals to leave behind perceptual rigidities that keep them stuck in behavioral patterns. In contrast, depersonalization may involve lower control in acquiring new self- and world models, leading to rigid disintegration of habitual self-experiences and a feeling of being stuck in one's mind.

Zoomed out: digital media use and depersonalization experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown.

Scientific reports March 10, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Luke McEllin, Julian Kiverstein et al.

During the COVID-19 lockdown, increased use of digital media and online social meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation—a sense of being detached from oneself, one's body, or the world. In a worldwide online study of 622 participants, those reporting more depersonalisation also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions compared to positive ones. People whose lives were more affected by lockdown experienced depersonalisation more frequently. The findings suggest potential risks of overly sedentary, hyper-digitalised lifestyles that may induce feelings of living in one's 'head', disconnected from the body, self, and world.