Topics in cognitive science
October 1, 2012
Julian Kiverstein
72 citations
Philosophers of embodied cognitive science disagree on the meaning of embodiment. The debate centers on whether the field can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, body functionalism, sees the body as linking external problem-solving resources with internal biological machinery, supporting computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues that no computational account can explain the role of commonsense knowledge in everyday practical engagement. The author attempts a reconciliation of these opposing views.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Lars Sandved-Smith, Juan Diego Bogotá, Jakob Hohwy et al.
10 citations
A computational formalism called deep parametric active inference, rooted in Bayesian mechanics, can bridge first-person phenomenological accounts of experience and third-person physiological measurements, fulfilling the neurophenomenology programme's goal of mutual constraints. The dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics allows generative passage between lived experience and its neural instantiation under certain conditions. This paper argues that incorporating trained reflective awareness into empirical protocols yields incremental explanatory gains, shifting focus from the contents of experience to the how of experience—the activities of consciousness that constitute meaningful appearance. The resulting deep computational neurophenomenology gains explanatory power from disciplined circulation between perspectives, enabled by generative models that form beliefs about their own modelling parameters.
Lars Sandved-Smith, Juan Diego Bogotá, Jakob Hohwy et al.
7 citations
preprint
This paper extends the neurophenomenology program by using Bayesian mechanics, specifically deep parametric active inference, to show how first-person accounts of experience and third-person physiological data can mutually constrain each other. The dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics establishes generative passages between lived experience and its physiological instantiation under certain conditions. The authors argue that shifting focus from the contents of experience to the activities of consciousness—the 'how' of experience—yields incremental epistemic gains. The resulting framework, deep computational neurophenomenology, gains explanatory power from disciplined circulation between perspectives, enabled by generative models that form beliefs about their own modeling parameters. Trained reflective awareness is essential for this approach.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2023
Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller
6 citations
Playfulness, understood as a learned high-level prior that tolerates and explores uncertainty in safe contexts, can contribute to human flourishing by expanding the amount of surprise a person is prepared to accept. Playful individuals attend to the world in an open, expansive, and effortless way that fosters presence and deep engagement, leading to renewed appreciation for life. They actively seek challenges at the edge of their abilities, promoting growth in skills and relationships. Additionally, they monitor and learn from their own affective responses to uncertainty, turning it into something familiar and enjoyable to explore. Thus, openness to uncertainty may be an important ingredient in a meaningful life.
Philosophical Psychology
November 30, 2025
Julian Kiverstein, Hüseyin Beyköylü, Michiel van Elk
3 citations
Psychedelic experiences are shaped by the interaction of the drug, the user's psychological state (set), and the environment (setting), not just by pharmacology. A causal pluralist theory holds that multiple valid explanations—pharmacological, neural, psychological, social, political, and historical—can account for how set and setting influence the experience. Concepts from enactive cognitive science help clarify how higher-level causes like psychological states and cultural practices work, but enactive science has not yet produced testable models. Predictive processing theory may fill that gap. A pluralist synthesis of enactive cognitive science and predictive processing could provide the best conceptual tools for understanding the psychedelic experience scientifically.
Current topics in behavioral neurosciences
January 1, 2025
Julian Kiverstein
This chapter examines Bud Craig's theory of 'global emotional moments' (GEMs) and its implications for the experience of time. Craig argued that each GEM is supported by a large-scale neural network centered on the anterior insula cortex, which integrates interoceptive signals from the autonomic nervous system with hedonic and motivational signals from sensory perception. GEMs function as moving windows of time within which a phenomenal, embodied self is experienced. Craig proposed a 'cinemascopic' theory where GEMs combine to form a stream of consciousness like a movie. The author argues that because GEMs have duration, they count against philosophical 'cinematic' theories that treat the phenomenal now as consisting of discrete, instantaneous moments. The chapter concludes by considering how Craig's theory informs debates about whether the phenomenal now has temporal depth.
Scientific reports
March 10, 2022
Anna Ciaunica, Luke McEllin, Julian Kiverstein et al.
During the COVID-19 lockdown, increased use of digital media and online social meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation—a sense of being detached from oneself, one's body, or the world. In a worldwide online study of 622 participants, those reporting more depersonalisation also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions compared to positive ones. People whose lives were more affected by lockdown experienced depersonalisation more frequently. The findings suggest potential risks of overly sedentary, hyper-digitalised lifestyles that may induce feelings of living in one's 'head', disconnected from the body, self, and world.