The meaning of embodiment.

Philosophers of embodied cognitive science disagree on the meaning of embodiment. The debate centers on whether the field can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, body functionalism, sees the body as linking external problem-solving resources with internal biological machinery, supporting computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues that no computational account can explain the role of commonsense knowledge in everyday practical engagement. The author attempts a reconciliation of these opposing views.

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Abstract

There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. Embodiment is thus understood in terms of the role the body plays in supporting the computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues by contrast that no computational account of cognition can account for the role of commonsense knowledge in our everyday practical engagement with the world. I will attempt a reconciliation of these seemingly opposed views.