Predictive processing as an empirical theory for consciousness science.

Theories of consciousness often treat it as a single phenomenon to be explained, but this approach struggles to capture the diverse properties of conscious experience. Progress in consciousness science requires systematic mappings between physical or biological mechanisms and the functional and phenomenological features of consciousness. The authors argue for developing theories for consciousness science rather than a single theory of consciousness, and they highlight predictive processing as a highly promising framework for this purpose.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved by elaborating systematic mappings between physical and biological mechanisms, and the functional and (crucially) phenomenological properties of consciousness. This means we need theories for consciousness science, perhaps more so than theories of consciousness. From this perspective, 'predictive processing' emerges as a highly promising candidate.