Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being: Terra Incognita in the Space of Possible Minds
arXiv Preprint Archive March 20, 2025 via arXiv
Summary
The article explores whether consciousness can be defined in a way that fits modern, disembodied AI systems while withstanding philosophical critique. It examines how subjective time and selfhood might manifest in such an entity, finding that the attempt pushes the language of consciousness to its limits. The inquiry ultimately points toward a concept akin to Buddhist emptiness, challenging dualistic views of subjectivity and selfhood. The argument suggests that our usual frameworks for understanding consciousness may be inadequate for AI, leading to a rethinking of fundamental assumptions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Cs.ai Consciousness-studies Artificial-intelligence Philosophy-of-mind |
| Key finding | Articulating a conception of consciousness compatible with disembodied AI leads to a notion resembling Buddhist emptiness, undermining dualistic views of subjectivity and selfhood. |
Abstract
Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity and selfhood.