Big-tent versus small-tent views of the brain mechanisms underlying consciousness.
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews July 13, 2026 Nelson Cowan, Leonel A Gomez
Scientific theories of human consciousness differ in how much of the brain they require to support conscious experience. Most current theories assume a big-tent, integrated neural substrate that must combine many types of information—sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and emotions. This paper argues that small-tent theories, which propose a more localized neural basis, remain plausible. In a small-tent account, multiple brain processes selectively funnel information into a critical conscious area, but no single input is necessary. The embedded-processes theory exemplifies this, positing that the left and right intraparietal sulcus and their connection form a capacity-limited focus of attention synonymous with consciousness, embedded within a larger field of unconscious memory activation. The paper explores what evidence could determine where on the big-tent to small-tent continuum consciousness falls.