Phenomenal structuralism argues that what makes a conscious experience what it is depends on the relationships among its qualities, not on any intrinsic features of those qualities. This view, while illuminating, creates serious problems for comparing experiences across different people or even within the same person over time. If experiences are individuated only by their relational structure, it becomes doubtful that two people can ever share the same kind of pain, raising ethical concerns. The approach also fails to explain how different sets of qualities could lead to the same discriminations. The paper suggests representationalism as an alternative that might preserve the strengths of phenomenal structuralism without these problematic consequences.
A minimal form of self-awareness—Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness)—is a non-conceptual, identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for conscious experience. Contrary to claims that altered states such as those induced by psychedelics, meditation, or dreams disrupt this minimal self-awareness, the evidence does not support its absence. While some typical forms of self-awareness may be compromised, PFP-Awareness remains intact. Reports suggesting a radical disruption likely stem from confirmation bias, influenced by subjects' expectations and metaphysical views, and should be mistrusted.