Mathematical models of consciousness often lack a clear justification for their formal structure. This article provides that justification by examining what makes phenomenal experience suitable for mathematical representation. It derives a general mathematical framework grounded in the epistemic context of consciousness—specifically, the non-collatability of experience and the structure of phenomenal space. The framework shows how key characteristics of conscious experience imply particular mathematical structures, allowing theory-building to go beyond what standard philosophical methodology alone can achieve. The result is a formal foundation that can guide the development and evaluation of specific mathematical models of consciousness.
Computational functionalism holds that consciousness is a form of computation. This paper demonstrates that consciousness cannot be a Turing computation, but instead aligns with a type of computation proposed by Geoffrey Hinton called mortal computation.
Falsification, a cornerstone of scientific testing, is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. In the standard experimental setup, a theory's predicted experience (based on brain data) is compared with an inferred experience (based on report or behavior). If inference and prediction are independent, any minimally informative theory is automatically falsified—a dilemma for many current theories that rely on report to infer conscious experience. If inference and prediction are strictly dependent, the theory becomes unfalsifiable. The paper explores potential ways out of this dilemma, highlighting a fundamental challenge for empirical testing in consciousness research.