Could we perceive the world differently than we do? Neuroscience-based emergentism and the biological function of consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition June 14, 2026 Cyriel M. A. Pennartz, Micha Engeser
Conscious experiences are not accidental byproducts but serve a specific biological function: they provide a multimodal, situational survey of the brain's environment (including the body) that enables deliberate, planned behaviors. This argument is grounded in a neurorepresentationalist position that rejects the separation of phenomenal consciousness from its neural substrate, treating them as one functional entity. The function is illustrated by perceptual phenomena such as seeing the world upright, multisensory integration, and spatial object constancy. Pathological cases like Anton and Bonnet syndrome, where misrepresentation of reality severely impairs behavior, further support this view. The position is contrasted with other proposals, particularly those emphasizing a learning function of consciousness.