Front Psychol
March 18, 2024
Bruno Forti
4 citations
The hard problem of consciousness—explaining how subjective experience arises from brain activity—remains unsolved because experience and neural structure are too different to be directly compatible. One alternative is to analyze the structure of consciousness within experience itself, starting with the simplest forms found in early vision. Qualia such as the redness of red are inseparable from their experiential context and may be phenomenal artifacts. The simplest qualitative aspects in early vision have relational significance and form a unitary whole, yet phenomenal appearance alone does not reveal a unitary structure. This suggests exploring the components of experience as possible explanations.
Front Psychol
April 8, 2024
Bruno Forti
3 citations
Bridging the explanatory gap between physical brain processes and conscious experience may require analyzing the structure of consciousness from within, rather than seeking purely neural correlates. A phenomenal analysis of early vision suggests that the simplest conscious experiences are not isolated qualia but unitary sets of qualities. This analysis hypothesizes a hidden structure of consciousness composed of a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other, each formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary space, though not directly perceptible, can be characterized as phenomenally negative through a subtraction of visibility. This hierarchical structure can explain the qualitative nature of perceptual organization and may serve as an intermediate bridge between experience and brain organization, potentially helping to close the explanatory gap.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2025
Bruno Forti
1 citation
A new theory of consciousness, the Extended Information Theory (EIT), proposes that the simplest forms of experience are not sensations but perceptions where qualitative aspects have relational significance. Phenomenal analysis of early visual experience reveals a nested Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings, indicating that conscious contents extend into the space they belong to. This extension allows immediate knowledge of structural aspects of the physical world. Functionally, consciousness handles extended information, unlike non-conscious systems that process point-like information, potentially overcoming computational limitations. The theory differs from classical integration-based theories by emphasizing the integration of information about stimulus structure.
Frontiers in Psychology
June 29, 2026
Bruno Forti
Conscious vision, according to Extended Information Theory, lets us know how objects extend into space, compensating for limitations of neuro-computational systems that handle point-like information. This paper explores links between spatial extension and two other properties of phenomenal experience: subjectivity and qualitative aspect. The author identifies thingness—the materialization of something extending into space—as an underlying property from which subjectivity and quality derive. Subjectivity involves a structure where a third-person world forms within a first-person world, creating egocentric knowledge. Quality conveys how something materializes based on its degree of differentiation from other qualities, transforming unconscious into conscious knowledge. A hypothesis is proposed for how qualities may originate from physical brain processes.