Buddhahood and Philosophy of Mind: Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and the Debate over Mental Content (Ākāra)
Knowledge@UChicago (University of Chicago) June 1, 2019 David Kerman Tomlinson 4 citations
This dissertation examines the debate between Indian Buddhist philosophers Ratnākaraśānti (970–1045) and Jñānaśrīmitra (980–1030) over whether conscious states inherently possess mental content (ākāra). Ratnākaraśānti argued that certain conscious states are contentless (nirākāra) and that intentionality is not the criterion of consciousness, grounding his view in a theory of buddhahood. Jñānaśrīmitra countered that consciousness by nature has content or appearance (sākāra), developing a defense in his Sākārasiddhiśāstra that includes a view of non-duality and wondrously variegated cognition (citrādvaita). The work shows how these philosophers brought Buddhist concerns about buddhahood and the path to bear on philosophy of mind.