Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2022
Jolien C. Francken, L. Beerendonk, D. Molenaar et al.
96 citations
A survey of 166 consciousness researchers reveals ongoing debate about the definition and study of consciousness. Most respondents believe machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is gradual across the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, covering both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. The survey identifies which theories of consciousness are considered most promising and how different theories cluster, which dependent measures best index consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be its most likely signatures. These findings offer a snapshot of current views to help prioritize research and theoretical approaches.
June 14, 2021
Jolien C. Francken, L. Beerendonk, D. Molenaar et al.
23 citations
preprint
A survey of 232 active consciousness scientists reveals ongoing debate about the definition of consciousness and how to study it. Most respondents believe machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is gradual across the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, covering both low- and high-level cognition. The results identify which theories of consciousness are considered most promising, how different theories cluster, which behavioral measures best index consciousness, and which neural measures are most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings offer a snapshot of dominant views among professionals, potentially helping to prioritize research and theoretical approaches.
bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory)
April 22, 2026
Sabine Gnodde, Vlada Aslanov, Jolien C. Francken et al.
Perceptual awareness is linked to early, posterior brain activity rather than later frontal processes. Using electroencephalography with a cross-decoding method that minimized report-related confounds, participants viewed gratings in backward-masking and no-report tasks. Classifiers trained on stimulus location in the no-report task were tested on masked trials sorted by subjective visibility. Decoding revealed a reliable difference between subjectively visible and invisible stimuli from 130 to 170 milliseconds, driven by posterior sensors over occipital, temporal, and parietal regions. No corresponding effects were observed over frontal sensors, suggesting frontal activity in report-based paradigms reflects post-perceptual processing rather than awareness itself.