Consciousness plays an essential role in explaining how we acquire knowledge and epistemically justified belief about ourselves and our surroundings. Unconscious creatures who behave just as we do—zombies—cannot know anything about the world, since they have no epistemic justification to believe anything. All epistemic justification depends ultimately on consciousness. The argument draws on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection, as well as general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory bridging epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
The author responds to criticisms raised during a scholarly symposium about their book, which argues that consciousness plays a fundamental role in knowledge and justification. The reply addresses specific objections from commentators, defending the central thesis that conscious mental states are necessary for epistemic access to reasons and evidence. The discussion engages with philosophical arguments about the relationship between consciousness, rationality, and the structure of epistemic justification.