Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
July 1, 2026
Paul W. Barnes
A response to Schneider and Bailey's Superpsychism argues that while their framework correctly identifies key features of a defensible ontology of consciousness, it falls short at five specific points. The Unified Axioconscious Field Theory (UAFT) supplies the missing elements: a single fundamentality, a specified mechanism for phenomenal consciousness, unification of time and gravity as codifferential expressions (gravitytime), a structural mechanism for macro-consciousness emergence (the pinch point), and self-grounding without simulation hypotheses. These bridges complete rather than replace Superpsychism.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
May 29, 2026
Paul W. Barnes
Intelligence, understanding, reasoning, and other mental concepts are being redefined through six specific fallacies—Hard Conflation, Concept Hollowing, the Stolen Concept, Package Dealing, Floating Abstractions, and the Anti-Concept—so that they apply to AI systems while discarding the phenomenal (subjective) aspects originally part of these concepts. Using intelligence as a central example, the argument shows that genuine intelligence requires registration, which requires an interior aspect, which is what phenomenal consciousness names; thus intelligence depends on consciousness. The contemporary view that AI is intelligent yet AI consciousness is intractable is maintained only by capturing both concepts in parallel. An eight-stage account describes how this captured vocabulary becomes the norm for understanding human cognition, erasing resources for recognizing phenomenal experience.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
May 18, 2026
Paul W. Barnes
Three distinct fallacies—Hard Conflation, Concept Hollowing, and the Stolen Concept—combine in contemporary AI and consciousness research to preserve the vocabulary of consciousness while abandoning its original phenomenal referent. Hard Conflation merges functional and phenomenal aspects under one term, creating false intractability. Concept Hollowing replaces consciousness with a methodologically tractable substitute. The Stolen Concept uses claims about phenomenal consciousness while denying the foundations that give it meaning. These fallacies redirect research to perceptions of AI consciousness rather than consciousness itself. The paper argues that treating consciousness as axiomatic rather than derivable from function dissolves the apparent intractability, and warns that as the vocabulary of consciousness is captured for AI systems, humans come to understand themselves through hollowed concepts.