Consciousness at sea.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences November 13, 2025 Irina Mikhalevich 2 citations
Evolutionary explanations of consciousness face three interconnected challenges: lingering misconceptions from evolutionary progressivism and adaptationism; the measurement problem of gathering comparative data on consciousness without an agreed-upon theory or meta-strategies; and unresolved questions about how to individuate traits for functional analysis. These challenges are illustrated through adaptive accounts that identify valence (the goodness or badness of psychological states), rather than phenomenal consciousness (the subjective experience of 'what it is like'), as the fitness-conferring trait. On such accounts, phenomenal consciousness is adaptive only if it and valence are part of the same trait; otherwise, it appears to be a byproduct of selection for valence. Whether they are part of the same trait depends on how traits are individuated and the relationship between valence and phenomenal consciousness.