Neuroscientific theories of consciousness must address how separate micro-units of information combine into a single, unified conscious experience—the phenomenal binding problem. This paper examines how Integrated Information Theory (IIT) v4.0 offers a solution by proposing that particular entities called 'complexes' define existence. While this works in a static framework, it creates difficulties when applied to dynamic systems. The authors identify a dilemma for IIT: non-local entity transitions versus contiguous selves, termed the 'dynamic entity evolution problem.' Three potential ways IIT could dissolve this dilemma are described. The paper contributes to IIT's shift from static to dynamic analysis.
A deliberately simple artificial neural network model can implement functional binding—combining micro-units of information for cognitive tasks—but fails to achieve phenomenal binding, the integration of micro-information into the unified, macro-scale conscious experience typical of human phenomenology. The model's failure highlights a key challenge for theories of consciousness: maintaining a distinction between unconscious and conscious processing while achieving phenomenal binding. Several established theories, including Integrated Information Theory, Orch-OR, and Conscious Electromagnetic Information Theory, map onto possible solution structures based on which parts of the model they elaborate or reject. Each proposed solution requires further development to fully account for phenomenal binding.