Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Perceptually-Guided Action vs. Sensation-Based Enaction.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2020 Catherine Read, Agnes Szokolszky 40 citations
Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both oppose representation-based cognitive science but differ fundamentally in their theories of sensation and perception. Ecological theory holds that perception is not based on sensation, a point illustrated through retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The paper emphasizes organism-environment mutuality, contrasting it with the structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior in Enactivism. Ecological-phenomenological methods arise from mutualism, linking Gibson's visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty's lived body. The authors conclude that convergence is impossible due to conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization between the approaches is possible and desirable.