Intentionality—the aboutness of mental states—has resisted naturalistic explanation partly because most theorists treat it as equivalent to mental representation. This paper argues instead that intentionality is a feature of whole embodied agents (organisms) that can be directed at objects and states of affairs, while representation belongs to mental states and their mechanisms. The distinction is applied to Metzinger's project of naturalizing phenomenal representation. The paper challenges enactivism's equation of cognition with biology, proposing that a theory of intentionality and representation should delineate cognitive science's subject matter and allow for artificial intelligence.
Finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC)—the minimal brain activity sufficient for a specific percept—faces a methodological dilemma. Conceptual decisions about how consciousness relates to attention, cognitive access, report, and other functions determine how correlation data are interpreted. Relying on subjective reports likely confounds the NCC with neural mechanisms for cognitive functions, because reports presuppose cognitive access. No-report paradigms risk confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. There appears to be no way to be sure that the neural correlate of conscious experience has been isolated.