Embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2010 Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors, Harold Bekkering 46 citations
The paper argues that criticisms of embodied cognition—such as whether sensorimotor brain activation is necessary for language comprehension and how we understand language for which we lack relevant experiences—stem from interpreting embodiment through a cognitivist lens. Instead, the authors propose an enactivist, non-representationalist model: language comprehension is procedural knowledge (knowing how, not knowing that) that enables interaction with others in a shared physical world. On this view, activation in modality-specific brain areas reflects the use of sensorimotor skills, and comprehension is context-bound. The enactivist approach thus supports an embodied view of language while avoiding the problems faced by cognitivist interpretations.