On Dependency between Wishes and Perception
Дискурс January 31, 2022 A. I. Ponomarev, K. G. Frolov
Desires can influence sensory perception, a phenomenon known as wishful seeing. Some philosophers argue that this dependence undermines the epistemic status of sensations, similar to how wishful thinking undermines beliefs, leading to skepticism. This article examines two strategies to counter that argument. One strategy holds that sensations are unlike beliefs, so their dependence on desires does not reduce their epistemic value. Another strategy contends that the influence of desires is limited to later stages of perception, while early vision remains unaffected; attention, which can be controlled and trained, mediates the influence. The article concludes that wishful seeing does not necessarily lower the epistemic status of sensations, and under certain conditions sensations can be rationally accepted, so the skeptical argument is not compelling.