Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
January 5, 2026
Jennifer Windt, Manuela Kirberg, Tomas Andrillon
This special issue brings together theoretical and empirical work on dreaming and waking mind wandering, two areas with growing attention in cognitive neuroscience and psychology but limited philosophical exploration. Despite being studied separately, phenomenological and neurophysiological overlaps between waking mind wandering and sleep-related experiences indicate they are closely linked. These connections prompt questions about the nature and functions of spontaneous mental phenomena, their relationship to wakefulness and sleep, and implications for theories of attention, action, and consciousness.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 22, 2025
M. Päßler, Adrien Doerig
Conscious experiences are defined by their relationships to one another, and these relationships are mirrored by brain structures. However, simply matching brain patterns to mental patterns is not enough to explain what a conscious experience is about. The brain's downstream processes must actively use those patterns in a way that preserves their structure and influences behavior. Purely anatomical or overly broad causal brain structures fail this test, but activation patterns can succeed when embedded in the right computational context. This means that local structuralist theories, which ignore how brain activity is used by subsequent processing, are incomplete. Any adequate structuralist account of consciousness must incorporate computational context.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
November 5, 2025
Valerie Bernard
Jean-Paul Sartre argues that the feeling of phenomenal presence—the sense that what one experiences is actually there—accompanies only perception, not imagination or dreaming. This puts him against contemporary philosophers like Amy Kind, who holds that imagination provides a sense of “presence in absence,” and Jennifer Windt and Michael Barkasi, who claim that dreaming involves immersion in a spatiotemporal dreamscape. The paper explains how Sartre’s theory of perception shares key objectives with contemporary naïve realism, and that his rejection of imaginative presence is consistent with why a naïve realist would also reject it. It contrasts Sartre’s view of why a dreamer lacks true immersion with the views of Windt and Barkasi.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
May 23, 2024
Nadine Meertens
This is a book review of Walter Veit's 'A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness,' which argues for a pragmatic, evolutionary approach to studying animal minds. Veit proposes that consciousness is a biological trait that varies across species and can be investigated through comparative methods, avoiding anthropocentric biases. The review discusses the book's main arguments, including its call for a more inclusive science of consciousness that considers diverse animal taxa. It highlights Veit's synthesis of philosophical analysis with empirical research, aiming to bridge gaps between disciplines. The review evaluates the book's contributions and limitations, noting its relevance for researchers in philosophy, biology, and psychology.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
April 19, 2022
Matthew Johnson
A review of Chris Letheby's 2021 book 'Philosophy of Psychedelics' highlights its role as a foundational work for understanding the modern therapeutic science of psychedelics. The book explores key philosophical topics that are likely to shape the future of psychedelic therapy, including how philosophical inquiry can deepen insights into therapeutic mechanisms and ethical considerations. The review emphasizes that philosophy will become increasingly important in the psychedelic therapy renaissance, and Letheby's work is positioned to influence responsible development and treatment advancement. The text recommends the book to both the public and academics seeking a deeper understanding of psychedelic medicine.