Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science July 8, 2022 Janko Nešić 2 citations
A recent information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness, presented as a form of panpsychism, is examined and argued to face the hard problem of consciousness, similar to Integrated Information Theory. The author proposes introducing a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics—specifically intrinsic information and intrinsic structure—to help the theory overcome this problem. These metaphysical enhancements move the theory beyond physicalism. Instead of panpsychism or physicalism, the author suggests combining the information-theoretic structuralist theory with neutral monist ontology, which better fits the framework. These reworkings could yield an improved naturalistic account called the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.