Despite fundamental differences, the philosophy of religion in the later work of Wittgenstein and the tradition of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) share three key similarities: belief and practice are inseparable, with practice taking priority over knowledge; core religious beliefs form the primal ground of perception and understanding, rather than being theoretical conclusions from rational reflection; and a new practice-laden narrative of religious realism emerges. This Wittgensteinian perspective allows even the most abstract metaphysical elements of mysticism to be reinterpreted: if fundamental religious beliefs are seen as descriptions arising from a practical form of life, then perceiving a transcendent sacred unity in the universe depends on purposive engagement and wayfaring in the natural and social world.
Mindfulness, as originally described in the Pāli suttas, was not a technique of focusing on an object (bare attention) but a form of reflexive self-awareness. This interpretation counters a recent phenomenological critique of the contemporary mindfulness movement. The article argues that right mindfulness (sammāsati) is a philosophical enterprise requiring awareness of broader context, and it cannot be cultivated by an ordinary person (puthujjana). Instead, it belongs to noble ones who have acquired right view and virtue.
In Advaita Vedānta, dreaming serves as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness and as a syllogistic illustration that unreal dream objects do not exist apart from the mind, thereby demonstrating the waking world's nonrealism and that waking objects are consciousness alone. The article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual's waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity, though distinctions between individual and īśvara become indeterminable from the standpoint of nondual brahman.