The phenomenology of the intersubjective impairment.
Journal of evaluation in clinical practice August 1, 2016 Inês Hipólito 6 citations
Disorders of the self in schizophrenia involve a disturbance of the minimal self—the most basic component of selfhood. This work synthesizes concepts from neuroscience, epistemology, and phenomenology to argue that the second-person perspective, which focuses on direct interaction and experience with others, offers a key point of congruence between objective processes and subjective experience. The author examines self-related deficits in schizophrenia first through first-person and third-person perspectives, then through the less understood second-person perspective. First-person disturbances include spatially incongruent proprioception and an impaired sense of time. The second-person approach is productive for social cognition research and may yield practical consequences for evidence-based medicine.