From Bodiless Kinesthesia to “Inner-Body”: On the Split of Body in Husserl’s Phenomenology
Husserl Studies June 3, 2026 Boda Liu
This paper reexamines Husserl's analyses of kinesthesia and bodiliness, arguing against two common interpretations: that his analysis of kinesthesia implies embodied subjectivity, and that the distinction between Leib (lived body) and Körper (physical body) provides a clear foundation for his theory of embodiment. Through close reading, the author shows that Husserl's notion of "bodiless kinesthesia" reveals a conceptual gap between kinesthetic experience and embodiment. Kinesthesia is defined not as inner bodily sensation but as the spontaneity of transcendental subjectivity, an egoic activity of the "I can," while the body itself is classified as not-egoic.