Pragmatism as Idealism? The Case of Mary Whiton Calkins.

Mary Whiton Calkins challenged the traditional view that American pragmatism was purely a logico-philosophical movement opposed to idealism. She argued that pragmatism includes psychological, logical, and metaphysical doctrines, and she characterized "metaphysical pragmatism" as a form of idealism. Calkins held that psychology should study reality as experienced through introspection, while philosophy should address the metaphysical nature of that reality. She understood pragmatism's pluralism as a "pluralistic personalism," where reality consists of a plurality of conscious selves. She rejected metaphysical pragmatism because she believed pluralism could not account for absolute truth, but she supported psychological pragmatism as metaphysically neutral.

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Abstract

American pragmatism is traditionally described as a logico-philosophical movement that arose in opposition to the theological and metaphysical assumptions of the early American idealists. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) challenges this narrative in two central ways: she presents pragmatism as encompassing psychological, logical, and metaphysical doctrines, and she characterizes "metaphysical pragmatism" as a form of idealism. This paper offers a systematic reconstruction of Calkins's philosophical and psychological commitments to explain these challenges to the traditional narrative. The first part proposes that Calkins's taxonomy of "pragmatisms" reflects her views on the proper roles of philosophy and psychology. During a time when psychology was separating from philosophy, Calkins argued that psychology should study reality as experienced through introspection, while philosophy should address the metaphysical nature of the realities experienced. The second part of this article explores Calkins's rationale for characterizing metaphysical pragmatism as idealism. She understood the pluralism characteristic of pragmatism as a "pluralistic personalism", where reality is the nature of consciousness, and consciousness is viewed as a plurality of conscious selves. Calkins rejected metaphysical pragmatism because she believed that pluralism could not account for absolute truth. However, she maintained support for psychological pragmatism, believing it to be metaphysically neutral. The article concludes with a brief critical analysis of Calkins's position on pragmatism as regards her philosophy-psychology distinction and the supposed opposition between pragmatism and metaphysics more broadly.