Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism.

Philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism can be resolved through Charles Peirce's pragmatism. Enactivism's Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been interpreted as implying anti-realist 'world-construction', which some find controversial. A proposed 'entity realism' by Zahidi places subjects in worlds of things they can manipulate, but fails to sustain the realist claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world—a claim crucial for scientific progress. Peirce's distinction between existence and reality, along with his inquiry-based account of cognition, generalizes Zahidi's manipulation-based realism into a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. This realism supports pan-species monism about truth, encouraging investigation of non-human animal cognition.

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Abstract

This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce's pragmatism. Enactivism's Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist 'world-construction' which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(3), 461-475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking's 'entity realism', which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards 'internal realism', he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress - the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce's pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi's manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism's pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.