The Complex Brain Hypothesis: Resolving the Entropy-Content Conundrum in Minimal Phenomenal Experience

States of consciousness with minimal phenomenal content, such as those induced by certain meditation practices, show increased brain entropy similar to high-content psychedelic states, challenging the Entropic Brain Hypothesis that links entropy to phenomenal richness. The Complex Brain Hypothesis resolves this by proposing that brain complexity, not entropy, better indexes the richness of experience. Complexity is modulated by the grain of inference the brain uses to resolve uncertainty: fine-grained inference loosens constraints and proliferates content, as in psychedelic states; coarse-grained inference simplifies experience into contentless awareness, as in minimal phenomenal experiences. Both regimes can elevate entropy but differ in phenomenology and perturbational signatures, refining the Entropic Brain Hypothesis and highlighting minimal phenomenal experiences as a test case for computational theories of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) are states of consciousness in which wakefulness is preserved but phenomenal content is low or absent. The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (EBH) is a model of conscious processes that regards the entropy of spontaneous brain activity as a marker of 'phenomenal richness', exemplified by high-content psychedelic experiences (HCPEs). Yet recent human neuroimaging studies of MPEs induced by meditation -- and possibly 5-MeO-DMT -- suggest that these states, defined by their phenomenological simplicity, also show signs of increased neurophysiological entropy. This presents a conundrum for the EBH: brain entropy is elevated with increased and decreased richness of the phenomenal experience. Here, we put forward the Complex Brain Hypothesis (CBH), which proposes that the richness of experience differentiating MPEs from HCPEs is better indexed by complexity than by entropy. We argue that brain complexity is modulated by the grain of inference through which the brain resolves uncertainty: some HCPEs exemplify a fine-grained regime, in which loosened constraints amplify fluctuations into proliferating content, whereas some MPEs exemplify a coarse-grained regime, in which a simpler model dissolves variety into an experience of 'contentless' awareness. Both regimes can be associated with elevated brain entropy, but they diverge in phenomenology and perturbational signatures. By resolving the entropy-content conundrum, the CBH refines the EBH and highlights MPEs as an important test case for computational theories of consciousness.