Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness propose that a mental state becomes conscious when it is represented by another mental state—a higher-order state. Two main versions exist: higher-order perception (HOP) theory, which models this representation on perception, and higher-order thought (HOT) theory, which models it on thought. Some HO theories require active representation, while others accept a mere disposition to be represented. The goal is a reductive explanation of conscious states in terms of nonconscious higher-order representation. This chapter outlines the motivation for HO views, contrasts HOP and HOT, considers objections and empirical support, and addresses how the theory tackles the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness hold that a mental state is conscious when it is appropriately represented by a ‘higher-order’ state, a state about another mental state. The higher-order perception (HOP) theory holds that HO representation is best modeled on perceptual processes, while the higher-order thought (HOT) theory holds that it is best modeled on thought. In addition, some HO theories hold that to be conscious, a state must be actively represented by an HO state, while others maintain that the mere disposition to be represented by an HO state is enough. The HO theory, if successful, offers a reductive explanation of mental state consciousness in terms of nonconscious HO representation. This chapter first spells out the general motivation for the HO view and the differences between HOP and HOT before considering key objections to the approach, as well as possible empirical support. Finally it looks at how the view addresses the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.