Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness.

The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness is often misunderstood. This theoretical paper clarifies HOT's position, distinguishing it from global workspace theory and early sensory models. Critics have accused HOT of overintellectualizing consciousness, but the authors argue that the cognitive requirements for higher-order states are considerably less than often presumed, positioning HOT as intermediate between other views. Most HOT proponents do not equate consciousness with metacognition or confidence. Compared to other theories, HOT can better account for complex everyday experiences like emotions and episodic memories, making it useful for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

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Abstract

The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here, we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views, such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g., first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for overintellectualizing consciousness. We show that, while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are in fact considerably less than often presumed. In this sense, HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. We also clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Furthermore, compared with other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.